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A politician and mother of seven girls has introduced a bill
to ban female infanticide in her South Asian nation. While all
homicide, at least after birth, is already technically illegal in her
country, the law has long been ineffectual, being applied only to
boy children; thousands of infant girls are killed with impunity
each year. Mrs. Nightingale Singh's plan is to make it clear by
legislation-followed by pressure upon the police and prosecut-
ing authorities-that to kill a healthy child, simply for being a
girl, is a crime. She realizes that this will leave unaffected the
many hundreds of handicapped babies of both sexes who are
smothered each year-a tragedy in her eyes, though possibly less
cruel than the lethal neglect called "nursing care only" and
"demand feeding" suffered by handicapped children in the more
primitive hospitals of the Western world. Her own opposition to
all infanticide is well-known, but she realizes that there is at pre-
sent no realistic hope of getting an effective universal ban on the
practice in her country.
The problem is that, quite apart from the anti-population
lobby and certain other conservatives who predictably support
infanticide on demand, one of the pro-life groups has become
her vehement critic. This group, which claims to speak for all
right-thinking pro-lifers, declares that, by seeking only to ban sex-
selection infanticide, Mrs. Singh is implicitly conceding both the
legality and the morality of killing infants on other grounds such
as handicap. The group accuses her of thereby engaging in
"intrinsically evil acts" herself, as well as formally cooperating in
the evil acts of others: she is promoting or, at least, acquiescing in
infanticide and willingly sacrificing some handicapped children's
lives in order to save some healthy baby girls. But one may not
do evil in the vain hope that good may come of it, her critics
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remind her. The law, as it presently stands, is quite clear: no
infanticide, full-stop. Trying to limit the harm by appearing to
concede a little infanticide would only further undermine the
law and the pro-life message. And it would also leave her and her
supporters excommunicated-an especially puzzling threat for
Mrs. Singh given that she is a pious Hindu.
Meanwhile, Afro-MP Muhammed Ignatius Mboembe Le Vie
is promoting an anti-cloning bill in the newly formed African
Union. While cloning is being attempted for some extinct game
animals and a low-cholesterol hippopotamus is being genetically
engineered for the table, this science had not yet been applied to
humans in the African Union. Le Vie is aware, however, that in
America and Europe, where such practices with respect to
human beings have been authoritatively declared to be contrary
to human dignity by parliaments or presidents, they are increas-
ingly common practices and often funded by those same authori-
ties. Le Vie thinks there is a very good chance of getting an
Africa-wide ban on so-called "reproductive" cloning (cloning
intended to produce a live-born child), but is less confident of
also achieving a ban on so-called "therapeutic" cloning (the even
more unethical kind of cloning, where embryos are created in
order to be cannibalized for experimental purposes). He thinks
there is very little chance of a ban on destructive human embryo
experimentation in general.
Dr. Le Vie plans to put up a bill banning all three practices,
but is willing to fall back to a ban on cloning, or even to a ban on
only reproductive cloning, as required by the vicissitudes of the
political debate. He had considered going for a ban on all repro-
ductive technologies that are profligate with early human life or
that disintegrate life-making from love-making, but he realizes
this would probably mean the bill would get no hearing at all
because of the power of the in vitro fertilization (lVF) lobby in
some member states of the African Union. Once again, however,
he is opposed not only by those who favor laissez-faire in this
area, but also by a group calling themselves the Defenders of the
African Family Today (DAFT). DAFT declares that it cannot sup-
port any bill that does not at least go for a complete ban on con-
doms, artificial reproduction, sex education in schools, and the
public dissemination of the theory of evolution.
Meanwhile, in the new leftist Spain, a physician-assisted sui-
cide (PAS) bill has widespread popular support and is likely soon
to be passed with majorities similar to those of the already-passed
gay marriage and liberalized abortion bills. Provincial MP Don
Miguel-Angel Vida thinks he will vote against the physician-
assisted suicide bill in any case, but is toying with proposing an
THE DUTIES OF A CATHOLIC POLITICIAN
amendment that would require that anyone who is to be assisted
with suicide must first be given a pamphlet describing in graphic
detail the last stages of death by poisoning and offering alterna-
tives such as good palliative and pastoral care. He also plans to
support an amendment by a pro-life colleague of another party
which would require a one week "cooling off period" between
the consent to assisted suicide and its implementation.
Don Vida is uncertain, however. He wonders about the pru-
dence of amendments that might seem to lend some credibility
to the PAS bill and the wicked practice it condones; the con-
sciences of a few weaker MPs may be appeased by the thought
that "at least there are safeguards" so that they will then vote in
favor of the amended bill. Furthermore, Vida's proposal might
itself be amended by his opponents, so that the mandatory infor-
mation sheet given prior to consent would end up tame at best, if
not actually pro-suicide. He wonders whether it might be best to
take an absolute stand against the bill or even just to let sleeping
dogs lie and hope the bill will fail. Maybe this generation should
just give up on pro-life lawmaking or simply refuse even the
appearance of collaboration in laws that broaden the range of
legal homicide. He asks his elderly parish priest what he should
do. The monsignor suggests prayers to San Jose El Patron della
Felice Morte and refers the question to a classmate who lectures
at the seminary. The advice-that Don Vida should follow his
conscience-arrives three days after the final vote on the bill.
The complementary roles of priests and laity in the formula-
tion of public policy were described by the Second Vatican Coun-
cil in Gaudium et Spes.
Secular duties and activities belong properly although not
exclusively to laymen .... Laymen should also know that it
is generally the function of their well-formed Christian
conscience to see that the divine law is inscribed in the life
of the earthly city; from priests they may look for spiritual
light and nourishment. Let the layman not imagine that
his pastors are always such experts, that to every problem
which arises, however complicated, they can readily give a
concrete solution, or even that such is their mission.
Rather, enlightened by Christian wisdom and giving close
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attention to the teaching authority of the Church, let the
layman take on his own distinctive role.'
Regarding what they called "the difficult but very noble art of
politics," the Fathers of Vatican II praised "the work of those who
for the common good devote themselves to the service of the
state and take on the burdens of office."2 Of politicians, they
counseled that "[w]ith integrity and wisdom, they must take
action against any form of injustice and tyranny."' Lawmaking
has an important role to play in such action against injustice: it
formally recognizes the duty of protecting the rights of all per-
sons, families, and groups in the community and proscribes any
attacks upon those rights and persons.4 In this context, the
responsibility of lawmakers and those who influence them to pro-
tect the life of all members of the community from conception
until natural death was reaffirmed by the Council5 and has since
been repeated very often by popes and bishops, as well as many
other faithful Christians, clerical and lay.
But no politician can do everything, and good laws will only
take us so far in building up a civilization of life and love. Mor-
ally sensitive lawmakers also face many dilemmas as to what kinds
of laws to seek, what to oppose, what to seek to ameliorate by
amendment, and what to do as a means to such ends. This essay
will focus on a particular group of causae conscientiae often
encountered in the conventional political struggle in defense of
innocent human life: the duties of a politician with respect to
laws in the area of abortion, infanticide, embryo destruction,
euthanasia, and other crimes against life-especially in those sit-
uations where the laws are not presently, and are not likely in the
near future to be, as "perfect"6 as the pro-life politician7 would
desire. These questions are all the more important in the con-
1. SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES: PASTORAL
CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD No. 43 (1965) [herein-
after GAUDIUM ET SPES].
2. Id. No. 75.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Nos. 27, 51.
6. The language of "perfect" and "imperfect" bio-legislation has been
common in ecclesiastical circles at least since the 1994 Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) Symposium. See I CATTOLICI E LA SOCIETA PLURAL-
ISTA: IL CASO DELLE 'LEGGI IMPERFETrE' [Catholics and the Pluralistic Society:
The Case of Imperfect Laws] (1996).
7. I use the category "pro-life" to cover not only Catholic and like-minded
Christian politicians, but all those who draw conclusions like those articulated
in Part II of this paper. Much of what I say will apply mutatis mutandis to those
who advise, lobby, and support them.
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text of recent debates about whether and when a Catholic politi-
cian might be formally excommunicated for his position on laws
in this area.
In considering such questions I cannot elaborate a full polit-
ical ethic here, nor articulate all the principles to be followed or
all the qualities to be cultivated in civic leaders. Nor can I
describe the complex process of discernment appropriate in any
political judgment. While relying upon the authoritative teach-
ings of the Catholic Church, I cannot elaborate as fully as I would
like all the theological presuppositions that underpin those
teachings, the levels of authority with which they have been pro-
posed, or the common ground such teachings have with the posi-
tions of many other Christians, pro-lifers, and persons of good
will. While I will often refer to abortion legislation in particular
to illustrate the principles I will elaborate in this essay, many of
them will apply ceteris paibus to other areas of bio-legislation such
as those I outlined in my opening (fictitious) examples.
I. WHAT POLITICIANS CANNOT RIGHTLY Do WITH RESPECT TO
BIo-LEGISLATION
Since the Council, a series of documents have offered some
counsel to Christian politicians on the positive course reasonably
to be taken with respect to the protection of human life. These
have included declarations of the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith,8 speeches of Pope John Paul II,' interventions by
the Holy See at U.N. meetings, statements by national bishops'
conferences, responses of individual bishops to Catholic politi-
cians-and much else besides-all culminating in the great
encyclical Evangelium Vitae.10 A number of positions, not uncom-
mon in contemporary discourse and practice, have also been
authoritatively refuted. Rather than rehash the substantial argu-
mentation offered in those texts, or offered by theologians who
8. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, QUAESTIO DE ABORTU"
DECLARATION ON ABORTION (1974) [hereinafter QUAESTIO DE ABORTU]; CON-
GREGATION FOR THE DOCTMNE OF THE FAITH, JURA ET BONA: DECLARATION ON
EUTHANASIA (1980) [hereinafter JURA ET BONA]; CONGREGATION FOR THE Doc-
TRINE OF THE FAITH, DONUM VITAE: INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE IN
ITS ORIGIN AND THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION: REPLIES TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF
THE DAY No. 3 (1987) [hereinafter DONUM VITAE]; CONGREGATION OF THE Doc-
TRINE OF THE FAITH, DOCTRINAL NOTE ON SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PAR-
TICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE (2003) [hereinafter DOCTRINAL
NOTE]; see also CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH Nos. 898-99, 1923, 2246,
2273 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter CATECHISM].
9. These are yet to be definitively collected but are very numerous.
10. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETrER EVANGELIUM VITAE (1995)
[hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE].
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support those teachings, it must suffice for present purposes to
summarize six positive conclusions regarding bio-politics:
(1) It is the duty of politicians to ensure that civil law serves
the common good and reflects fundamental moral
norms (especially those regarding basic human rights),
and that it protects from unjust attack the vulnerable
(including the unborn, disabled, frail, elderly, sick, and
dying).11
(2) It is likewise the duty of politicians to lead rather than
merely follow public opinion in such crucial matters,
and to seek to ensure the widest possible consensus for
the good on them.12
(3) Far from being an imposition upon the consciences of
others, laws that protect the vulnerable from the imposi-
tions of the strong reflect a healthy respect for human
rights and fundamental moral norms, and they assist
people to grow in virtue;" those whose religion part-
motivates their political struggle in this area are thus
11. St. Thomas Aquinas taught that not all immoral activities can or
should be proscribed at law; thus the Church does not counsel politicians to
enact laws against adultery or lying even though it regards such activities as
wrong. But if the law should not seek to prohibit all vices, it should at least
prohibit the more serious (e.g., lethal) ones: "human laws do not forbid all
vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from
which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the
hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be
maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like." THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. I-I, Q. 96, Art. 2 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1915). Several recent magisterial
documents have insisted that it is a primary function of the criminal law to
ensure that all members of society enjoy respect for their fundamental rights,
such as the right to life. See CATECHISM, supra note 8, No. 2273; DONUM VITAE,
supra note 8, No. 3; EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, Nos. 4, 20, 68-72; POPE
JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER PACEM IN TERRIS (1963); QUAESTIO DE ABORTU,
supra note 8, No. 20.
12. DONUM VITAE, supra note 8, No. 3.
13. "It is true that it is not the task of the law to choose between points of
view or to impose one rather than another. But the life of the child takes prece-
dence over all opinions. One cannot invoke freedom of thought to destroy this
life." QUAESTIO DE ABORTU, supra note 8, No. 20. "Recourse to the conscience
of each individual and to the self-regulation of researchers cannot be sufficient
for ensuring respect for personal rights and public order .... The task of the
civil law is to ensure the common good of people through the recognition of
and the defence of fundamental rights and through the promotion of peace
and of public morality." DONUM VITAE, supra note 8, No. 3. "The legal tolera-
tion of abortion . . . can in no way claim to be based on respect for the con-
science of others, precisely because society has the right and the duty to protect
itself against abuses which can occur in the name of conscience and under the
pretext of freedom." EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, No. 71.
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not guilty of religious intolerance or imposition, but
merely of assuming their proper role in a democratic
polity.
14
(4) On the other hand, laws that deny protection to certain
classes of human beings undermine the common good
and expose even the supposedly democratic state as
tyrannical; 15 such laws are not morally binding and must
not be obeyed. 1 6
(5) Direct abortion and euthanasia are intrinsically and
gravely evil, since they are the deliberate killing of inno-
cent human beings, and no circumstance, purpose, or
law can ever make them right;' v they also attack family
14. Likewise, those whose faith supports their action with respect to abor-
tion law are no more guilty of "imposing their beliefs" upon others than are
their doctrinaire libertarian or secular opponents.
15. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, No. 20 discusses the "tyrant State,
which arrogates to itself the right to dispose of the life of the weakest and most
defenceless members" (emphasis added). See also id. No. 70. Cf CATECHISM,
supra note 8, No. 2273 (citing DONUM VITAE, supra note 8, No. 3).
16. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, Nos. 69, 72, 73, 90. In his impor-
tant reflection upon the implications of grievously unjust laws, John Paul con-
cludes that:
Laws which authorize and promote abortion and euthanasia are there-
fore radically opposed not only to the good of the individual but also
to the common good; as such they are completely lacking in authentic
juridical validity. Disregard for the right to life, precisely because it
leads to the killing of the person whom society exists to serve, is what
most directly conflicts with the possibility of achieving the common
good. Consequently, a civil law authorizing abortion or euthanasia
ceases by that very fact to be a true, morally binding civil law.
Id. No. 72. Here he is in the tradition of St. Thomas who taught that "a tyranni-
cal law, through not being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely speak-
ing, but rather a perversion of law." AQUINAS, supra note 11, Pt. I-I, Q. 92, Art.
1, Obj. 4 & Respondeo. Following St. Augustine, John Paul further con-cluded
that unjust laws are "acts of violence rather than laws" because "'a law that is not
just, seems to be no law at all."' AQUINAS, supra note 11, Pt. I-II, Q. 96, Art. 4,
Obj. 3 (quoting AUGUSTINE, DE LIBERO ARBITRIO: THE FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL
No. i, 5).
17. E.g., EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, Nos. 57, 62, 65. John Paul II
here echoes Vatican II, which had declared the following:
All offences against life itself, such as . . . abortion, euthanasia and
willful self-destruction, are criminal. They poison civilization, they
debase the perpetrators even more than the victims . . . they dishon-
our the Creator.
Life must be protected with the utmost care from the mo-
ment of conception: abortion and infanticide are abominable crimes.
GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 1, Nos. 27, 51; see also CATECHISM, supra note 8,
Nos. 2268-79; HOLY SEE, CHARTER ON THE RIGHTS OF THE FAMILY No. 4 (1983);
POPE PAUL VI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER HUMANAE VITAE No. 14 (1968) [hereinafter
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and community."8 This is a conclusion of well-informed
natural reason, even unaided by faith, and therefore
proper ground for political action even in an avowedly
"secular" society.19 Revelation mediated by the Church
clarifies and confirms this conclusion 20 and gives addi-
tional grounds for political action in any self-consciously
Christian society or any pluralist democratic society with
some Christian voters and leaders. 2 '
HuMANAE VITAE]. The gravity with which the Church views the procurement of
abortion is reflected in the latae sententiae excommunication under Canon 1398
of the CODE OF CANON LAw (1983).
18. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, Nos. 42-45, 53-67.
19. On the basis of the teaching with respect to abortion in the Scrip-
tures, the Christian tradition, natural law philosophy, and the magisterium of the
Catholic Church, see EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10; MICHAEL J. GORMAN,
ABORTION AND THE EARLY CHURCH (1982); GERMAIN G. GRISEZ, ABORTION: THE
MYTHS, THE REALITIES, AND THE ARGUMENTS (1970); DAVID A. JONES, THE SOUL
OF THE EMBRYO: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE STATUS OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO IN THE
CHRISTIAN TRADITION (2004); Ignacio Carrasco de Paula, The Respect Due to the
Human Embryo: A Historical and Doctrinal Perspective, in IDENTITY AND STATUTE OF
HUMAN EMBRYO 48-73 (Juan De Dios Vial Correa & Elio Sgreccia eds., 1997);
John Finnis, Abortion and Healthcare Ethics II, in PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH CARE ETH-
iCs 547-58 (Raanan Gillon ed., 1994). On the basis of the teaching with respect
to euthanasia, see EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10; THE DEPENDENT ELDERLY.
AUTONOMY, JUSTICE AND QUALITY OF CARE (Luke Gormally ed., 1992); Anthony
Fisher, Theological Aspects of Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL,
CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 315 (John Keown ed., 1995).
20. There is some dispute about the status of the three definitions in
Evangelium Vitae, and in particular whether they are proposed as an exercise of
the "ordinary" or the "extraordinary" magisterium of the Church, whether of the
papal or episcopal magisterium or the sensus fidelium. All of these kinds of
authority seem to me to have been appealed to in Evangelium Vitae (and the
tradition behind it), and for these reasons and others the present writer
believes that Catholic teaching on the intrinsic evil of all direct abortion is pro-
posed infallibly. The later publication ofJohn Paul II's Apostolic Letter, MOTU
PROPRIO An TUENDAM FIDEM (1998), and of the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith's accompanying Commentary seemed to confirm that this teaching is
an example of one "definitively proposed by the Church regarding teaching on
faith and morals" and "necessary for faithfully keeping and expounding the
deposit of faith, even if they have not been proposed by the Magisterium of the
Church as formally revealed." CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONCLUDING FORMULA OF THE 'PROFESSIO FIDEL' No. 6
(1998). Following Vatican II, these documents suggest that the Catholic faith-
ful are required to give "firm and definitive assent to these truths," and
"[w]hoever denies these truths would be in a position of rejecting a truth of
Catholic doctrine and would therefore no longer be in full communion with
the Catholic Church." Id.
21. Catholic teaching on abortion, euthanasia, etc., while amenable to
reason unaided by faith, is also a matter of faith, since it is believed by Catholics
not only on the basis of persuasive philosophical and sociological reasons but
also on the authority of the Scriptures, the Christian tradition, and the living
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(6) Therefore, politicians must act individually or in con-
cert to ensure that the law prohibits all homicide,
including abortion, embryo destruction, infanticide,
and euthanasia.22
The arguments that the Catholic Church (and others) pre-
sent for these six claims are sophisticated, persuasive and, I
believe, conclusive. Various things follow. Commonly heard
counterproposals that are incompatible with Catholic teaching on
bio-politics include:
(1) Abortion, euthanasia, etc., are morally permissible.23
(2) Attitudes to abortion, euthanasia, and the like are mat-
ters of "private morality" or "personal religion," and
therefore should not influence public policy.24
magisterium of the Church. The gravity of the matter is all the greater when it is
realized that such acts involve the killing of a being made in the image of God, that
they are contrary not only to practical reason but also to God's will, and that they
involve not only an attack upon a basic human value (life) but also the renuncia-
tion of a sacred trust. On the complex relationship between faith and reason in
such matters, see POPEJOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER FIDES ET RATIO (1998).
For a fascinating work on the implications of a more self-conscious focus on
building a Christian society, see AIDAN NICHOLS, CHRISTENDOM AwAKE: ON RE-
ENERGISING THE CHURCH IN CULTURE (1999).
22. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, Nos. 68-74, especially No. 72.
23. Some Catholics or other Christians openly declare themselves
opposed to the Church's teaching on abortion or euthanasia and yet claim they
are believing and practising members of their church. Holding that direct
abortion or euthanasia is always wrong, it is asserted, is not a "core belief" for
Christians in the way that, for instance, belief in Divine Revelation or the Trinity
are, and conscience must have primacy in moral matters. The Catholic Church,
however, makes a clear distinction between a well-formed conscience, on the
one hand, and arbitrary preference or intuition on the other. E.g., DONUM
VITAE, supra note 8, Nos. 2-3; GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 1, Nos. 16-30. The
moral character of actions is determined by objective criteria, not merely by the
sincerity of intentions or the goodness of motives, and all people are called to
form their consciences accordingly. Id. Nos. 27, 51; SECOND VATICAN ECUMENI-
CAL COUNCIL, LUMEN GENTIUM: DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN
THE MODERN WORLD Nos. 12, 25 (1964); POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER
VERITATIS SPLENDOR ch. 2 (1993) [hereinafter VERITATIS SPLENDOR]. Given the
consistency and gravity of Church teaching in this area, "(conscientiously) Cath-
olic and pro-abortion" makes about as much sense as "(conscientiously) Catho-
lic and anti-Eucharist" or "Catholic and pro-rape."
24. Catholic teaching on human rights questions such as abortion is no
more mysteriously religious or sectarian than its teaching against slavery,
apartheid, or unjust wars. To characterize these matters as "private morality" or
"personal religion" is an evasion amounting to ethical relativism. See EVANGE-
LIUM VITAE, supra note 10, No. 70; GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 1, No. 43; RoB-
ERT P. GEORGE, POLITICAL ACTION AND LEGAL REFORM IN Evangelium Vitae
(1996), available at http://www.nccbuscc.org/prolife/programs/rlp/96rlpgeo.
htm.
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(3) Respect for the consciences of constituents, including
those who do not believe abortion or euthanasia is
wrong, requires that their elected representatives make
no laws that interfere with their right to exercise their
conscientious beliefs in this area.25
(4) Politicians must respect and enact majority opinion on
such matters, whatever the majority opinion is. 26
(5) Therefore, a politician may initiate or should support
(and a citizen may obey) a law that admits in principle
the licitness of abortion or euthanasia.27
In addition to the range of things that a politician might not
reasonably initiate, sponsor, or by his affirmative vote legislate,
there are also those actions which have the effect of assisting
others in the liberalization of abortion laws, and thus in the prac-
tice of abortion-this occasions concern about cooperation in
another's evil. I do not need to rehearse the principles gov-
erning this kind of moral act here.28 Suffice it to say that a legis-
lator who favors permissive abortion, and therefore actively
supports someone else's permissive bill or actively blocks some-
one else's restrictions to such a bill, engages in formal coopera-
tion in the evil of the sponsor of the legislation. So too does one
uninterested in the abortion issue who nonetheless supports
such a bill or blocks such restrictions, hoping thereby to gain
something else, such as appeasing certain opponents, keeping
his or her seat, or horse-trading support for some other (possibly
better) legislative objective. In such cases, politicians can be
guilty of formal cooperation in evil even if they disapprove of
abortion and say so publicly. The sad reality is that some of the
worst collaborators in permissive abortion regimes in recent
decades have been politicians ostensibly opposed to abortion.
25. Contra QUAESTIO DE ABORTU, supra note 8, No. 20. See also DONUM
VITAE, supra note 8, No. 3; EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, No. 71.
26. Contra EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, Nos. 20, 70.
27. Contra QUAESTIO DE ABORTU, supra note 8, No. 21. Cf EVANGELIUM
VITAE, supra note 10, Nos. 59, 72-74, 90.
28. See EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, Nos. 73-74; VERITATIS SPLEN-
DOR, supra note 23, No. 78; 3 GERMAIN GPjSEz, Difficult Moral Questions, in THE
WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: DIFFICULT MORAL QUESTIONS (1997), especially at
871-98; Anthony Fisher, Co-Operation in Evil, 44(3) CATHOLIC MED. Q., Feb.
1994, at 15-22; Anthony Fisher, Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issues, in
COOPERATION, COMPLICITY & CONSCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN HEALTHCARE, SCIENCE,
LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (Helen Watt ed., 2006).
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II. WHAT POLITICIANS CAN RIGHTLY Do WITH RESPECT TO Bio-
LEGISlATION: THE MORAL ACT OF INITIATING OR
SUPPORTING AN "IMPERFECT" ABORTION OR
EUTHANASIA LAW
Having reviewed very briefly some commonly heard posi-
tions which are, in my view, excluded for politicians, I come now
to consider what they reasonably can do. The applicable moral
principles in this area are those concerning the intended object
of the moral act, and concerning formal and material coopera-
tion in an evil instigated by another person; there are also several
virtues at issue that I will treat at the end of this paper.
In situations where abortion, infanticide, embryo experi-
mentation, euthanasia, and the like are already clearly illegal,
leaders must remain vigilant lest such laws are flouted or diluted
by permissive judgments in causes cdgbre; they must seek to edu-
cate the public about the values underpinning and the benefits
of maintaining such laws; they must counter those forces which
will always be at work to undermine the civilization of life and
love. Above all, perhaps, leaders must work to minimize not just
the supply, but also the demand for abortion and the rest-to
ensure that public education, financial and social support, coun-
seling, and the like are more than adequate, so that unwanted
pregnancy is rare and those who are troubled by their pregnancy
are as fully supported as possible. Likewise, the frail, elderly,
sick, and disabled must not only be protected by laws, but so
loved and cared for by communities that killing them becomes
unthinkable.
Would that most of us came from countries where the weak-
ening of a well-nigh perfect legislative regime with respect to the
protection of human life were the worry! The tragedy is that
most of the Western world, at least, now operates under systems
tolerant of thousands or millions of abortions per year and
increasingly tolerant of embryo destruction and euthanasia (at
least by neglect). The "culture of death," so tellingly identified
by Pope John Paul II, is now predominant in the West and means
that violence has become so commonplace that even practicing
Christians rarely reflect on just how bloody are the supposedly
enlightened institutions and practices of their community.
Here we might distinguish several kinds of unjust bio-legal
situations:
(1) Killing is presently de jure legal in some jurisdictions
due to constitutional law. This is the case with respect to
abortion in the United States according to a series of
Supreme Court decisions supposedly interpreting the
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U.S. Constitution but actually unashamedly engaging in
eisogesis and judicial legislation.
(2) Killing is presently de jure legal in some jurisdictions
due to statutory law. This was briefly the case with respect
to euthanasia in Australia's Northern Territory, and is
so today with respect to physician-assisted suicide in the
U.S. state of Oregon, with respect to abortion in the
U.K., much of Europe and the Western two-thirds of
Australia, and with respect to destructive embryo experi-
mentation in many jurisdictions.
(3) Killing is presently de jure legal in some jurisdictions
due to permissive interpretations by courts of a prima facie
restrictive statute. This was the case with respect to
abortion in the U.K. before the 1967 Abortion Act,29 is
the case today with respect to abortion in the Eastern
states of Australia, is increasingly the case in Ireland,
and is the case with respect to active euthanasia in the
Netherlands and euthanasia by neglect in several juris-
dictions, most notably Britain since the Bland decision."
(4) Killing is presently dejure illegal but de facto allowed in
some jurisdictions, either because the law is not
enforced by the police, the prosecuting authorities,
and/or the courts, or because, while illegal according to
the letter of the law, past experience and present reali-
ties indicate that a conviction is probably impossible
under the present law. This is the case throughout
much of the Western world today with respect to much
bio-legislation.
In these situations the question immediately arises: are poli-
ticians bound to seek to change constitutions or to pass laws to
make illegal practices such as abortion in all circumstances? And
if the passage of such constitutional amendments or statutes is,
for the time being, impossible without a miracle, are they bound,
or at least permitted, to seek to pass laws that at least tighten up
the situation in some way-so that at least some abortion, infanti-
cide, embryo destruction, or euthanasia that might otherwise
occur would not? (Such a course of action has in fact been tried,
and has sometimes succeeded, in some places at some times.")
If such a restrictive yet still permissive bill is proposed, are pro-
29. Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87 (Eng.).
30. Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, [1993] A.C. 789 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.).
31. For a thorough review of various attempts to ameliorate or enforce
British abortion laws and the almost impenetrable obstacles to the passage of
such laws, see JOHN KEOwN, ABORTION, DocrToRs AND THE LAw (1988).
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life politicians bound to support it, oppose it, or take some mid-
dle course?
What happens if someone from the other side, as it were,
proposes some new law to make access to abortion or euthanasia
legal, more clearly legal, or more broadly legal than it presently
is? Suppose that the passage of such a bill seems very likely.
Should or may a pro-life politician oppose such a bill at all stages,
or support the bill at certain stages of the legislative process but
not at others, in the hope of gaining some concession? Should
such an MP, while opposing the bill as a whole, propose or sup-
port amendments to the bill which would, at least, tighten up the
regime envisaged by the bill so that at least some abortion or
euthanasia that might otherwise occur would not?
In Evangelium Vitae No. 73, Pope John Paul II notes:
A particular problem of conscience can arise in cases
where a legislative vote would be decisive for the passage of
a more restrictive law, aimed at limiting the number of
authorized abortions, in place of a more permissive law
already passed or ready to be voted on. Such cases are not
infrequent. It is a fact that while in some parts of the world
there continue to be campaigns to introduce laws favoring
abortion, often supported by powerful international orga-
nizations, in other nations-particularly those which have
already experienced the bitter fruits of such permissive leg-
islation-there are growing signs of a rethinking in this
matter. In a case like the one just mentioned, when it is
not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abor-
tion law, an elected official, whose absolute personal oppo-
sition to procured abortion was well known, could licitly
support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such
a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level
of general opinion and public morality. This does not in
fact represent an illicit co-operation with an unjust law, but
rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil
aspects.
32. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, No. 73. This is repeated in DOCTRI-
NAL NoTE, supra note 8, at 4. Likewise the then-Cardinal Ratzinger wrote in
May 1982 in response to a request from the U.S. Bishops regarding the Hatch
amendment:
[A]ccording to the principles of Catholic morality, an action can be
considered licit whose object and proximate effect consist in limiting
an evil insofar as possible.
Thus, when one intervenes in a situation judged evil in order to
correct it for the better, and when the action is not evil in itself, such
an action should be considered not as the voluntary acceptance of the
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Following this text, the Secretary of the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith, Archbishop Tarcisio Bertone, wrote:
By virtue of their specific vocation, it is mainly up to
lay Christians to engage with imperfect laws in present-day
democracy. Three attitudes are possible here:
(1) Prophetic resistance ... may... be justified in the
Church if a lay Christian prefers to opt for the value placed
in question by the law [here: absolute respect for life]
rather than opt for the lesser evil [here: a less "imperfect"
abortion law, etc.].
(2) Collaboration. A less radical attitude, or one of
greater collaboration, is permitted by the Church if it is
possible to promote a lesser evil than that proposed by the
law .... [H]ere .. .it is not the [lesser] evil as such that is
at issue here, but the good, more specifically the good nec-
essary to defuse or reduce the evil .... [I] t is never permit-
ted to do evil or use evil means to produce a good end;
nonetheless each value, by the very fact that it belongs to
what is good or what is true, asks to be respected ...
[Because this strategy] may be difficult to understand for
those not directly involved in the political experience and
unfamiliar with its very complex ramifications ... [it] must
be publicly explained by those who take such a decision on
grounds of conscience. Once this effort has been made
with all the necessary seriousness, the legislator must not
let himself be tormented, or [pressured into] chang[ing]
attitude, as a result of the false interpretation that may be
given to his gesture.
(3) Toleration . ..of the evil expressed through an
unjust law ... can only be possible if resistance to the evil
would involve a yet greater evil. 33
This important teaching has already occasioned considera-
ble debate amongst faithful Catholics and their pro-life friends. 4
lesser evil but rather as the effective improvement of the existing situa-
tion, even though one remains aware that not all evil present is able to
be eliminated for the moment.
R.G. Peters, Stopping Abortion: The Pragmatist's View, CATHOLIC TWIN CIRCLE,
Sept. 17, 1989, at 14 (quoting Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Letter to the Ameri-
can Bishops (May 1982)).
33. Tarcisio Bertone, Catholics and Pluralist Society: "Imperfect Laws" and .the
Responsibility of Legislators, in EVANGELIUM VITAE-FIVE YEARS OF CONFRONTATION
W-IT THE SOCIETY 206 Uuan De Dios Vial Correa & Elio Sgreccia eds., 2001).
34. See Colin Harte, Challenging a Consensus: Why Evangelium Vitae Does
Not Permit Legislators to Vote for 'Imperfect Legislation, in CULTURE OF LIFE-CUL-
TURE OF DEATH (Luke Gormally ed., 2002); see also COLIN HARTE, CHANGING
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To some it appears a contradiction: how can anyone who believes
all abortion is wrong support 'just a little abortion"? Is a spirit of
appeasement or pragmatism being manifested in Vatican polit-
ics? Are we engaging in evil in the vain hope that good may
come, trading some lives for others? Has despair of ever having
sound laws and practices in this area resulted in a sell-out?35
I think not, but I recognize that understanding Catholic
teaching in this area, like understanding the Christian Gospel on
many topics, requires a certain amount of arduous and dispas-
sionate thinking. And in the heat of political debate, in the face
of urgency, amongst politicians and public not well versed in the
nooks and crannies of ethical theory, all led by media either
unhelpfully simplistic or plainly hostile, people may be inclined
to dismiss such thinking as a luxury or unnecessarily convoluted.
I believe this view is wrong, if understandable. A parallel might
usefully be drawn, perhaps, with respect to Catholic teaching on
the just war. It is complex and will not always deliver up a single
clear answer on which wars are just ones and which ways of fight-
ing them are just. Some will, however, be clearly unjust. And the
complexities of the argument are no excuse for not doing the
hard thinking. Too much is at stake to simply embrace "my
country right or wrong" or a dogmatic pacifism. The same is true
in our present discussion.
John Finnis has explained the application of these principles
to abortion law reform as follows:
[According to Evangelium Vitae,] the always illicit vote is
[the vote] for a law as permitting, precisely to permit, abor-
tion. This is always illicit, even if one is personally opposed
to abortion and is voting for it only to keep one's seat and
prevent euthanasia or genocide laws, or only to equalize
the position of the poor and the rich. The kind of vote
which . . .[Evangelium Vitae] judges can be licit has as its
object not: to permit abortions now illegal but rather: to pro-
hibit abortions now legal or imminently likely otherwise to
become legal. (Say: the existing law or the threatened
alternative bill says abortion is lawful up to 24 weeks, while
the law or bill for which the Catholic legislator is voting for
UNJUST LAWS JUSTLY (2005). Also consider the exchange between Harte and
Finnis in COOPERATION, COMPLICITY & CONSCIENCE, supra note 28.
35. For an example of a commentator who, while not openly critical of
"an incremental strategy, proposing or supporting laws that would limit abor-
tion but allow it in some cases," is clearly deeply uncomfortable with it and
ultimately concludes that such laws, while not excluded in principle, are always
imprudent, see CHARLES E. RICE, THE WINNING SIDE: QUESTIONS ON LMNG THE
CULTURE OF LIFE 225-33 (1999).
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says abortion is lawful up to 16 weeks.) Even though it is a
vote for a law which does permit abortion, it is chosen by
this legislator as a vote for a law which restricts abortion.
That this restrictive law also permits abortion is only a side-
effect-when we consider the act of voting in the perspec-
tive of the acting person-even though the side-effect of
permission is as immediate as the object of restriction. 36
The ink of these (and the surrounding) words of Professor Finnis
was barely dry when lawmakers and pro-lifers in two different
Australian jurisdictions were debating their implications for new
laws. The sometimes bitter disputes during those legislative
debates reflected confusion over some matters worth a little
more and cooler attention from this distance because they are
instructive about broader questions of conscience for bio-politics;
there will no doubt be many echoes for those who have watched
or participated more actively in efforts to reform bio-law here in
Britain or across the various channels which separate her from
the rest of us.
III. SOME ISSUES RAISED BY Two AUSTRALIAN ATTEMPTS TO
APPLY EVANGELIUM VITAE No. 73
For those unaccustomed to what happened in the antipodes
in 1998-1999, I will summarize the background very briefly.17 In
Perth, Western Australia, bills were introduced to legalize abor-
tion on demand after a cause celdbre in which a doctor was charged
with criminal abortion; some pro-life MPs, while opposing the
bill(s) as a whole, promoted amendments which would at least
restrict abortion in some ways. In Canberra, on the other hand,
it was the pro-life parliamentarians in the local Australian Capital
Territory assembly who initiated change: in a situation of de facto
abortion on demand, they sought to introduce at least some reg-
ulation, especially through requiring that certain minimum
information be given to women about fetal development and
alternatives to abortion. In both cases, the pro-life politicians
achieved some limited success in a dreadfully hostile environ-
ment. And in both cases, the vilification came as much from
their pro-life friends as from their pro-abortion enemies. What
36. John Finnis, The Catholic Church and Public Policy Debates in Western Lib-
eral Societies: The Basis and Limits of Intellectual Engagement, in IssUEs FOR A CATHO-
Lr.w BIOETHic 261, 268-69 (Luke Gornally ed., 1999).
37. For fuller details, see Warwick Neville, Realpolitik, Theology and the Cul-
ture of Death: Abortion, Politics and Law in the Australian Capital Territory, 10
BIOETHIcs RESEARCH NOTES 37, 37-39 (1998).
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were the points of contention? Four are worth mentioning here
because they have wider ramifications.
A. Whether Evangelium Vitae No. 73 Applies to Existing Laws or
to Bills Being Debated or Both
First, there were some in Perth who asserted that Evangelium
Vitae No. 73 applied only to the introduction by pro-life MPs of
new laws aimed at restricting abortion in a permissive regime,
not to attempts to ameliorate by amendment permissive bills
introduced to a legislature by someone else. (On this view, Dr.
La Vie, and possibly Mrs. Singh, might be justified in their
actions but not Don Vida.) In Canberra, on the other hand,
some people-sometimes the same people-asserted the oppo-
site: Evangelium Vitae sanctioned attempts to ameliorate by
amendment other people's pro-abortion bills, but did not allow
the introduction of new laws in a permissive regime which would
restrict but not prohibit abortion. Yet, in praising efforts "aimed
at limiting the number of authorized abortions," the encyclical
clearly refers both to promoting new, more restrictive laws in
place of permissive ones already in place ("laws already passed")
and to promoting restrictive amendments to other people's per-
missive bills ("laws ready to be voted on"). Either way, the Pope
explains, when it is not possible to defeat a pro-abortion law or
bill, a politician could in certain circumstances licitly support a
proposal aimed at "limiting the harm done," without thereby
being responsible for the far-from-perfect state of the law. Even
had the Pope not been as clear as he was in fact, his principles
clearly apply equally both to existing and to proposed laws.
B. Where "Existing Law" Is To Be Found
Another dispute in this context was over whether, in consid-
ering what is the present state of the law (the "law already
passed"), one must refer only to a plain reading of existing stat-
utes. The reason this was so important is that throughout much
of Australia, abortion has never been legalized by statute as it was
in Britain in 1967; rather, courts have given permissive interpre-
tations of prima facie restrictive abortion statutes and law
"enforcement" agencies have done little to enforce even those
very liberal interpretations of the law. This has led to de facto
abortion on demand; in fact, Australia has a significantly higher
abortion rate than Britain despite the more permissive British
laws-it is now estimated that one in three Australian women has
had or will have an abortion. Of course, even those peoples not
blessed with a common law system, who must labor instead under
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codified criminal law, require authoritative interpretations and
applications of their constitutions, statutes, and treaties like any
other country. In common law jurisdictions with some legisla-
tion and some customary law of precedent, it is even more clearly
the case that the courts in part make the law. Law is not self-
interpreting; indeed, to the ordinary laity it often seems to mean
something very different from its plain words. With respect to
abortion, this is very much the case: activist courts in the United
States, Britain, Canada, and Australia have discovered exceptions
to the laws against abortion or rights to abortion hidden in words
where no plain reader would have dreamed of finding them.
The appalling U.S. rulings in Casey8 and in Stenberg v. Carhart"°
are among a long string of like judgments throughout the com-
mon law world. The Bland, Schiavo,4° and BWV" cases in Britain,
the United States, and Australia, respectively, suggest that same
thing is happening with respect to euthanasia by neglect, espe-
cially for those given the death sentence "permanent vegetative
state." Guiling as it is to those of us who are sure these are ideo-
logically-driven misreadings of the law, until a superior court or
legislature overrules these interpretations, they are for our pre-
sent purposes the law.
Furthermore, even accepting a plain reading of the statutes
forbidding abortion in Australia, such statutes are manifestly not
enforced by the police, the prosecuting authorities, or the courts.
It could well be argued that the statutes are therefore annulled
by desuetude.42 Several facts supported this view in West Austra-
lia and the Australian Capital Territory. First, "the average man
on the street" thinks abortion is legal, and governments, police,
and prosecuting authorities do nothing to disabuse him. Abor-
tions are financed under national health schemes or by insurers,
advertised in the media, approved by medical colleges, referred
for and performed by doctors "in good standing," and recom-
38. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
39. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
40. Schiavo ex reL Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla.
2005), aff'd, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005).
41. Re BWV; Ex pane Gardner (2003) 7 V.R. 487.
42. This raises the complex jurisprudential question of whether and
when a law ceases to be such by virtue of desuetude. Such assessments are
made on different bases in different jurisdictions and are provisional until an
authoritative pronouncement of desuetude has been made by a superior court
or the original law has been rescinded by the legislator. It might also be argued
that some laws are ineffective for their primary purpose (in this case, protecting
unborn human beings and their mothers from abortion) but effective for some
other purpose (e.g., protecting the right of some institutions and individuals to
refuse to provide such "services").
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mended by school counselors. Furthermore, the first attempt in
many years to initiate a case against a doctor who flagrantly broke
the West Australian abortion statute led to the prompt repeal of
that technical prohibition.
So what are we to make of an ineffectual law, ineffectual
indeed for several generations? Catholic theology going back at
least to St. Thomas Aquinas has been well aware that black-letter
laws are necessarily adapted "to time and place"; as Thomas
observed, consuetude et habet vim legis, et legem abolet, et est legum
interpretatrix. custom makes, unmakes, and interprets laws."
Thus the Law, taken in the broad, capital "L" sense of that which
a particular legal system brings about, is in some senses more and
in some senses less than the sum total of lower-case "I" laws (stat-
utes and precedents). And a lawmaker will properly take into
account what the Law effectively achieves, or can be expected
effectively to achieve, in making his decisions about what reforms
of the Law and thus what particular laws he will support.
C. The Prudence of Ameliorative Measures
A third point of dispute during the 1990s Australian debates
was over the prudence of particular measures proposed in spe-
cific contexts-a matter about which morally and factually well-
informed people may disagree even in ideal circumstances.
There was entirely appropriate disquiet about the risk that the
law would end up worse than it already was, or that a rare oppor-
tunity to make it better might be missed. There was further con-
cern about causing scandal either by action or inaction in these
circumstances, about the helpfulness of particular wordings and
amendments to wordings, and about the political minutiae of
when to move and in concert with whom and all the rest. Some
of these matters were of interest only to those involved at the
time. But the claim by some critics that these measures were so
imprudent as to involve willfully wrong acts, negligence, or
immoral material cooperation in evil deserves a little more
attention.44
I have already dealt with immoral initiation and cooperation
in the evil of legalizing or otherwise permitting offences against
43. AQUINAS, supra note 11, Pt. 1-11, Q. 97, Art. 3; cf. ROBERT GEORGE, MAK-
ING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 19-47 (1993).
44. RICE, supra note 35, at 233, addressing the American scene, asks,
"Although an incremental strategy of limiting abortion can be morally justified,
does it make practical sense?" He responds, "No. Period, paragraph, next case."
This assertion seems to be based upon a disjunction between sound moral prin-
ciple and virtuous practice. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, No. 73 certainly
does not declare imprudent behavior morally justified.
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innocent life. Evangelium Vitae No. 73 makes it clear that support
for imperfect laws is sometimes permissible, despite the material
cooperation it might lend to offences against life. What are the
reasons that might persuade a pro-life lawmaker to engage in
such material cooperation? One must examine these carefully
and honestly, taking them seriously without overstating them.
The most important one will be any unborn, handicapped, or
dying people the legislator believes might be saved, and any
others (such as pregnant women) who might also benefit, even if
not all can be saved or assisted. Politicians themselves can also
have much at stake, as might those who rely upon them. And
they might have various prior commitments and other responsi-
bilities to take into account. So before supporting an imperfect
bio-law, the politician must ask: how important are the benefits
expected from this activity, how extensive, how certain, and for
whom?
What are the relevant side-effects that would count against
such material cooperation? Again, politicians must examine
these carefully and honestly, not ignoring them simply because
they are unintended or minimizing them because of their enthu-
siasm for the benefits they hope to achieve by pursuing this
course of action. The most obvious ill-effect of material coopera-
tion is that it assists in another's wrong-doing-in this case the
passage of a law permitting abortion. Thus the legislator must
ask: what kind of loss or harm will result from the liberalization
of abortion with which I am unintentionally cooperating, or from
any other side-effects of my own activities? How extensive will the
harm be, how certain is it to occur, and who will suffer it? Will
my refusing to cooperate prevent the wrong-or will it go ahead
regardless? Am I in a position to stop it or at least reduce the
harm done? In what ways can I at least express my disapproval
and try to convert hearts and minds to my way of thinking?
Another bad side-effect of material cooperation is that it
may corrupt the politician concerned. She may find her strength
of will on these matters affected by having, even once, cooper-
ated materially in the evil of liberalizing abortion. She may
become blas6 about it, dulled to the evil side-effects and happy
enough to admit them as her own intention in the future. Or
she may find herself trapped in the company and schemes of
others she thought allies who do not in fact share her scruples;
the desire for solidarity and success may then carry her along
into formal cooperation with evil in the future, whether with
respect to bad bio-law or some other moral "compromise."
A third ill-effect of such material cooperation can be that it
corrupts others. Pro-life politicians who support imperfect bio-
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legislation may be misunderstood by others to be abandoning
their pro-life position; they might thereby "give scandal" to
others who do not appreciate the distinctions between inten-
tional ends and foreseen side-effects, formal cooperation and
material cooperation, etc. This might seriously impair the wit-
ness they could and should be giving to others. And their exam-
ple might encourage others not only to cooperate materially, but
even to cooperate formally, i.e., to advance even more permissive
abortion or to regard abortion less seriously. Pro-life politicians
must be prepared at times to take a stance against an activity by
privately or even fairly publicly refusing to cooperate even mate-
rially, and even at the risk of their political career; or, if they are
cooperating materially, at least to take as active a part as is practi-
cable in otherwise protesting against the evil practice they are
unwillingly facilitating.
D. Underlying Intentionality
A fourth area of concern in the late 1990s Australian debates
of enduring interest was over the conception of the moral act
underlying the Pope's argument, which some have impliedly
rejected by accusing those who followed it of being intentional-
ists or subjectivists. Here we enter the deep waters of act analysis
which Veritatis Splendor so helpfully plumbed for us, if not exhaus-
tively, teaching among other things:
The morality of the human act depends primarily and
fundamentally on the 'object' rationally chosen by the
deliberate will .... In order to be able to grasp the object
of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore
necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting
person. The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely
chosen kind of behavior .... By the object of a given moral
act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the
merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its abil-
ity to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside
world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a delib-
erate decision which determines the act of willing on the
part of the acting person.45
Even within the camp of those who support traditional Catholic
moral teaching and subscribe to the centrality of the object of
the moral act, there are differences of accent.
To give three examples, some years ago the British Bishops
taught that the victim of rape is entitled to defend herself against
45. VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 23, No. 78 (citation omitted).
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the continuing effects of such an attack, including preventing
the union of the rapist's sperm with her ovum, even by taking
"the pill" to prevent ovulation.46 Interventions aimed at causing
abortion after rape were, of course, excluded.4 7 This cautious
and nuanced position did not satisfy everyone. Some "perfec-
tionists" asserted that this episcopal teaching amounted to con-
doning the intrinsically evil act of contraception, at least in
certain cases, and that it promoted the doing of evil that good
may come of it. The Bishops explained that the object of taking
the pill in such cases is not to sterilize the woman's chosen sexual
acts in anticipation or retrospect (i.e., "contraception"), but to
protect her from the continuing attack of the rapist as his sperm
made its way up her reproductive system (i.e., "self-defense"); in
this respect, taking the pill is no more an act of contraception
than would be the woman pushing her rapist away just as he was
about to ejaculate. The complainants were not appeased by this
explanation. Their thought would seem to have been that the
object of an act can be seen from the outside, as it were: taking
the pill is obviously engaging in contraception, an act which can-
not be ordered to the good; "subjective" intention is only rele-
vant to ensuring that the act is free (and thus a genuinely human
act at all), and may reduce responsibility or gravity, but it cannot
affect the object which is "objectively" known.4"
Another example also hails from Britain: the teaching, a few
years ago, that the Rubella vaccine was licitly used despite the fact
that it is grown upon a cell line derived from an aborted girl.49
Despite careful explanation of the remoteness of the abortion
46. See British Bishops' Joint Comm. in Bioethical Issues, Use of the 'Morn-
ing After Pill' in Cases of Rape, 15 ORIGINS 633 (1986); British Bishops' Joint
Comm. in Bioethical Issues, A Reply, 16 ORIGINS 237 (1986); cf CATHOLIC
HEALTH AUSTRALIA, CODE OF ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH AND
AGED CARE SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA §§ 3.8, 3.9 (2001); Pa. Catholic Conference,
Guidelines for Catholic Hospitals Treating Victims of Sexual Assault, 22 ORIGINS 810
(1993).
47. It follows that measures such as the "morning-after pill" may only be
used after rape when they involve no significant risk to the life of a developing
embryo.
48. They referred especially to HuMANAE VITAE, supra note 17, No. 14 on
the intrinsic evil of contraceptive agents whatever the motives. However, the
very next paragraph of the encyclical notes, "The Church, on the contrary, does
not at all consider illicit the use of those therapeutic means truly necessary to
cure diseases of the organism, even if an impediment to procreation, which may
be foreseen, should result therefrom, provided such impediment is not, for
whatever motive, directly willed." This statement makes little sense if contracep-
tive agents are themselves (or their use always and everywhere) evil.
49. See Parents Left to Decide Over Controversial Vaccine, THE TABLET
(London), Oct. 29, 1994, at 1391.
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from the vaccinations, the difference of intended object, and the
lack of any formal cooperation in the evil of abortion on the part
of those giving or receiving the vaccine, there were those who
thought it was intrinsically wrong to use the vaccine whenever it
was cultured in this way. This question recurs periodically in the
pro-life literature and comes to the surface amongst parents and
schools.
A last example occurs at the other end of life. Advocates of
euthanasia often suggest that intentionally killing a patient
thought better off dead, withdrawing life-sustaining treatments
because they are too burdensome, and giving high doses of pain-
relieving agents to those in terrible pain, knowing that in the very
frail this sometimes risks suppressing respiration, are all the
same. But it is not only the pro-euthanasia advocates who associ-
ate these different kinds of act: some "perfectionists" from their
opponent camp also fudge these things. The thought here is
again: you just know, from the outside as it were, that removing a
ventilator from someone who is ventilator-dependent, or giving a
high dose of morphine, is killing. Full stop. While appeasing
their consciences with double talk of double effect and good
intentions, such health professionals are engaging in murder,
even if as a means to some merciful end.5°
My point in raising these controversial examples is that I
think that what was at issue in the debates between pro-lifers in
Australia in the late 1990s-something which has also dogged
Catholic politicians and the pro-life movement in many countries
over the past decade or so-is similar. On the face of it, it is a
difference over how "hard-line" one is about principle and how
willing to compromise in order to achieve results such as saving
babies' lives or relieving people's misery. But my suggestion is
that, unbeknownst to the disputants, there is often a major meta-
ethical difference between them-a difference of most basic
principles. This very difference over the characterization of
human acts has been as hotly debated between orthodox theolo-
gians of the Neo-Thomist and New Natural Law varieties as it has
been between orthodox Christians and their utilitarian oppo-
nents inside and outside the churches. 51
50. This is despite the clear teaching in the CATECHISM, supra note 8;
EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10; and JURA ET BONA, supra note 8. Cf GERMAIN
GRISEZ & JOSEPH M. BOYLE, JR., LIFE AND DEATH WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE
(1979).
51. See, e.g., the writings of G.E.M. Anscombe, Joseph Boyle, Stephen
Brock, John Finnis, Germain Grisez, Robert George, Pamela Hall, Russell Hit-
tinger, James Keenan, Anthony Lisska, David Nelson, David Oderberg, Henry
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I will not venture much further into that particular quag-
mire in this essay. Suffice it to say that I think one cannot make
sense of the Church's teaching on withdrawal of treatment, palli-
ative care, care of victims of sexual assault, the permissibility of
using drugs with a contraceptive effect for some genuinely thera-
peutic purpose, and the acceptability of certain vaccinations-
any more than one can understand the Pope's teaching on the
permissibility of certain less-than-perfect abortion laws-unless
one accepts an account of the object of the moral act something
like that proposed by Finnis, Grisez, and associates. But one can
also understand why, in a world where even the most unburden-
some kinds of care (such as feeding and hydration) are routinely
withdrawn from people no longer wanted, where babies and the
elderly are sedated to death, where victims of rape or even of a
night of carelessness are customarily treated with abortifacients,
and where some "Christian" politicians are unprincipled or plain
cowards, such moral theorizing can seem to some of the pro-life
troops to be a luxury almost designed to give comfort to the
enemy.
One way of helping people to think about these things is to
invite their thoughts on the complicity of God in the sins of the
world and indeed the death of Christ, or the complicity of Jesus
in the sickness of all those he did not cure, or the complicity of
Jesus' disciples in the injustices of the Roman Imperium, which
they helped finance by paying their taxes. Unsophisticated mor-
alists, such as the great Lutheran theologian Jfirgen Moltmann,
suggest that, yes, God was to blame: we are all caught up in the
tragedy of unavoidable evil and God is no less complicit-indeed
given his power, he is perhaps more so. Since God sent Jesus
into the world foreseeing he would be killed, and since God
could have intervened to prevent it, we must say that God killed
Jesus. So it is, Moltmann assures us, that on the cross we witness a
breakdown of the relationship which constitutes the very life of
the Trinity, the death of the Son, but also of the Son's sonship
and the Father's fatherhood, the utmost degree of enmity
between the persons of God.52 Offensive as this is to pious ears,
it reflects not so much the adolescent delight of the modern the-
ologian in shocking as it does the failure of many contemporary
minds to distinguish between what the scholastics called the
active and permissive will of God, or between intentionality and fore-
Veatch, and Daniel Westberg, and the contributions of several authors in vari-
ous collections edited by George.
52. SeeJORGEN MOLTMANN, THE CRUCIFIED GOD 149-52, 214, 243 (1974);
JORGEN MOLTMANN, THE TRINITY AND THE KINGDOM: THE DOCTRINE OF GOD
80-83 (1981).
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seeability in agents. In a world increasingly lacking the intellectual
equipment to think about these things, it is little wonder that
politicians who support less-than-perfect legislation, doctors who
administer the pill after rape, and nurses who remove ventilators,
are all thrown together with abortionists and other murderers.
Only by recovering a clear sense of God's horror at the sins
of the world and the death of his innocent Son (as indeed of all
his innocent children), of Jesus' bowel-churning pity in the face
of the sickness and confusion of his fellows, and of the disciples'
physical cooperation but moral non-complicity with the Roman
oppressor-despite their own actions and inactions-can we
begin to make sense of these things without blasphemy. Then we
will see more clearly that persons do not intend everything that
they tolerate-that people "choose" that-which-they-foresee-but-
do-not-purposely-bring-about in a morally very different sense
from the sense in which they "choose" that-which-they-purposely-
bring-about-as-their-end-or-means-to-their-end. One may hon-
estly intend the good, such as it is in an imperfect bio-law, while
foreseeing but not intending the imperfection(s) in it. 3
IV. SOME EXAMPLES OF REASONABLE STANCES FOR A PRo-LIFE
POLITICIAN VIS-A-VIS IMPERFECT Bio-LAws
A. Opposition to Permissive Bio-Laws at All Stages
Should a pro-life lawmaker support an imperfect bio-law? In
any particular instance of such a law, a legislator might well form
the view that, whatever its terms, bio-law reform in our current
circumstances is likely to have the net effect of making abortion
even more freely available and more commonly practised, or at
least of confirming and codifying an already shameful situation.
Legislators might hold that the present (prima facie, relatively
restrictive) statutes are the best that is politically possible at this
time and that, if preserved, such statutes have the potential for
stricter interpretation and/or enforcement in the future. They
might be persuaded that any new restrictions will be ignored in
practice, much as current bio-legislation is in many areas, or that
new loopholes will emerge through which more people's lives
would be put at risk. They might judge that a restrictive bill or
restrictive amendments would be unlikely to be passed or would
only be passed at the expense of some worse changes in other
respects or in other areas. They might suspect that by giving sup-
53. See Germain Grisez, Human Free Choice and Divine Causality, Edith
Stein Lecture, Department of Philosophy, Franciscan University of Steubenville
(Mar. 29, 2000).
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port to an imperfect bio-law, their witness against abortion, etc.
would be severely impaired and people would be scandalized.
Or they might conclude that, by refusing to be party even to
restrictive amendments to an imperfect bio-law, they will help to
ensure the defeat of that law altogether. While recognizing that
they have a prima facie duty to ensure (where no more is practi-
cable) that at least some babies are saved, and also recognizing
that one might support imperfect but restrictive bills or amend-
ments with this in view without thereby intending any evil, some
politicians may nonetheless judge that the likely or possible side-
effects of even that degree of involvement by them would be so
grave that the best course would be opposition to a particular
imperfect bio-law from start to finish of its legislative progress.
Those pro-lifers who oppose restrictive but imperfect bills
on these prudential grounds should be absolutely clear in their
own minds (and possibly in their statements) that they are
neither opposing all imperfect abortion legislation per se, nor
accusing all pro-life supporters of such bills or amendments of
intending permissive abortion, of formal cooperation in evil, of
being willing to trade life for life, or even of imprudence.
Rather, they make their own bestjudgment that by refusing to be
party even to such efforts they will serve best the ultimate goals of
creating a just and loving society, of saving babies and their
mothers, of opposing the further corruption of our culture and
our social fabric, and so on.
B. Support for Some (Restrictive) Bio-Law Reform in a
Permissive Situation
An alternative strategy for pro-life politicians, which also
seems to me to fall within the terms of Evangelium Vitae No. 73, is
to initiate or support a bill which, while continuing to allow some
abortions, restricts it in some ways-thereby protecting at least
some babies and their mothers. Leaders have a strong prima
facie duty to seek to protect the most vulnerable members of
their community, but sometimes that can only be achieved by the
gradual erosion of a de jure or de facto permissive abortion
regime through, among other things, imperfect abortion laws
which at least introduce some restrictions not presently in prac-
tice.5 4 While maintaining their ultimate goal of protecting the
54. As St. Thomas observed, "[I]t seems natural to human reason to
advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect." AQuINAS, supra note 11,
at Pt. I-Il, Q. 97, Art. 1. In an unpublished advice offered to some pro-life
groups during the Western Australian controversy, John Finnis suggested that if
a legislator judged that Western Australian law is already widely permissive of
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lives of all and being careful not to conclude too hastily that this
is presently impossible, pro-life MPs will sometimes conclude that
protecting some babies is all that they can do.
There are many kinds of restrictions to permissive bio-laws
that pro-life politicians may support if they have reason to believe
such restrictions will, if passed, be effective. Some examples in
the area of abortion laws (which would apply ceteris paribus to
other areas of bio-lawmaking) include legislation that:
* Restricts the stage of fetal development beyond which no
abortions are permitted (e.g., twelve weeks);
* Restricts the reasons for which abortion is permitted (e.g.,
excluding "social" abortion or abortion on demand) or
specifically prohibiting abortion on certain other
grounds (e.g., sex selection);
* Restricts where abortions may be performed (e.g., only in
public hospitals), and by whom (e.g., only doctors), and
licensing or otherwise restricting the number and activi-
ties of abortion providers;
* Restricts government funding or private insurance for
abortion;
* Restricts access to particular methods of abortion (e.g.,
banning "partial-birth" abortion or RU-486);
* Requires that more than one doctor certify that the abor-
tion is appropriate;
* Requires that adequate counseling of the women involved
be undertaken;
* Institutes strict information-giving provisions, including
requiring that women seeking abortion receive adequate
information about the unborn child, the risks of abor-
tion, and alternatives to abortion;
" Requires parental or guardian consent, or at least parental
or guardian notification of abortions performed on
abortion because it would be read as such by superior courts were it ever tested,
the politician could in good conscience vote for a bill which, if enacted:
would accord real legal protection to some class of unborn babies who
today are without that protection, even though the same Bill openly
and plainly affirmed and ensured that some (perhaps many or most)
other unborn babies remain unprotected (and are stripped of even
'paper' legal protection). That is to say, members holding the view I
have described could cast such a vote (and agree in advance to do so)
without immorally co-operating in the use of the legislative process to
deprive human persons of their inalienable moral and human right to
life.
Letter from John Finnis to Pro-Life Groups of Western Australia (1998) (on file
with author).
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under-aged girls, and judicial consent to abortion per-
formed on mentally handicapped women;
* Requires a cooling off period between the time at which the
doctor(s) certifies that an abortion may be performed
and the actual abortion;
* Provides for exemption on conscientious grounds of doc-
tors, nurses, pharmacists, and counselors from any
requirement that they perform, refer for, prescribe, dis-
pense, or otherwise cooperate in abortion;55 and
" Provides that no Church or other private institution can
be required to provide such procedures on its premises.
C. Support for Restrictive Amendments to Permissive Bio-Legislation
but Opposition to an Unjust Bill as a Whole
A third strategy consistent with Evangelium Vitae No. 73 that a
pro-life legislator may reasonably adopt-at least in the Westmin-
ster system with which I am best acquainted-would be publicly
to oppose an unjust bill from the beginning on the basis that it is
aimed, for instance, at permitting abortion on demand, then to
vote for various amendments in the committee stage involving
restrictions much like those proposed in the previous section,
but to oppose the final bill as amended because it will, in toto,
liberalize or confirm the de jure situation regarding abortion.
Here the politician is facing a law "ready to be voted on" and
does his or her best to improve that law.
As with the legislator who votes for a new, more restrictive
but still imperfect law, MPs who support restrictive amendments
must aim neither at permitting abortion in all other circumstances
(even though this is a foreseen side-effect), nor at lending
respectability to abortion performed within these restrictive cir-
cumstances; their goal must be to place some obstacles in the way
of abortion on demand in the hope that some abortions will
thereby be prevented and some babies saved. The elimination of
all induced abortion remains their goal, but in the meantime,
they propose or support amendments to a very permissive bill
likely soon to be passed. Their goal is to "tighten up" that new
law, hoping thereby to protect at least some, even if not all,
unborn children who would not otherwise have the benefit of
legal protection.
Of course, some supposedly pro-life politicians may disin-
genuously support such provisions with the real goal of permit-
ting a "moderate" or "morally respectable" amount of abortion,
as a way of evading taking an open stand for or against abortion,
55. See EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, No. 74.
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or because they are willing to trade some lives for others. Genu-
inely pro-life supporters of such moves, however, will only sup-
port them if they are convinced that they will amount to a real
restriction on the availability of abortion. Here there are impor-
tant judgments of prudence and wisdom to be made about what
actions will actually save lives, who else will be affected,56 what
messages will be conveyed to a morally unsophisticated public by
an unhelpful media, and what overall effect such moves will have
upon culture and society.
The following things seem to me to follow both with respect
to the introduction of additional but imperfect restrictions on
abortion or restrictive amendments to permissive bills, and ceteris
paribus to other areas of bio-legislation:
* To avoid "scandal," those supporting such imperfect leg-
islation must voice a clear and public opposition to all
abortion, and make it clear that in supporting such a bill
they are not retreating from their judgment that the pre-
sent permissive situation with respect to abortion is a seri-
ous violation of human rights.
* This strategy should not be adopted unless one judges
that the new law or the amendments would be inter-
preted more literally and enforced more rigorously than
existing statutes, and that in supporting the law or
amendments one is not wasting a real chance of persuad-
ing the authorities to interpret and enforce the present
law more strictly.
* This strategy should not be adopted unless one judges
that the net effect will be to increase, not diminish, the
present protection of the lives of unborn children.
* This strategy should only be adopted where it is likely to
contribute not only to better laws, but also to community
education in respect for life.
I noted above that one matter of contention among pro-life
lawmakers is the stage in the political process at which MPs
should engage privately in canvassing amendments or announce
publicly their willingness to discuss or support restrictive amend-
ments. Sometimes, the earlier amendments are canvassed, the
greater the likelihood that they will eventually be accepted, that
other helpful amendments will be proposed, or that the promot-
ers of a bill will be discouraged from persevering altogether. At
56. For example, an undesired effect of such moves might be that doctors
who at present can plead the de jure prohibition of abortion against claims in
tort for failure to provide an opportunity for an abortion find themselves with-
out such protection.
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other times, the earlier such amendments are proposed, the
more likely they are to generate organized opposition from the
proponents of a more permissive regime and the more likely they
are to grant some respectability to the bill as a whole. These are
again matters of prudent judgment for the politicians concerned,
taking into account their best assessments of the present and
likely future situation, the principles enunciated so far, and the
process of discernment sketched briefly below.
V. SOME VIRTUES OF A CATHOLIC POLITICIAN
A. The Virtues of Faith and (Political) Prudence
This paper has focused on very particular causae conscientiae
of pro-life politicians in the area of imperfect bio-legislation and
what the magisterium of the Catholic Church might say to or
imply about such questions. But this is only one-admittedly
especially contentious-range of problems amongst many others
for those who see law and politics as a vocation and those who
should. Hopefully the present volume has provided many other
insights into other aspects of those especially important voca-
tions. But the present cases, and the ways one goes about sorting
them out, may however provide something of a "litmus test" for
assessing a particular person's likely reaction on many other
questions. If, for instance, a politician adopts a minimalist prag-
matism or a more high-sounding utilitarianism or proportional-
ism on these matters, he may very well do so on many others.57
But it is also the case that many lawmakers are as inconsistent as
anyone else in their moral reasoning. This makes recent debates
about how to vote and whether to excommunicate all the more
complex.
I have argued that in the present circumstances many com-
monly espoused positions are ruled out for the faithful and pru-
dent political leader with respect to imperfect bio-laws, but that
several remain as possible. Which of these is to be preferred will
depend upon the fine detail of particular legal and political situa-
tions, the commitments and opportunities which present them-
selves to particular legislators in all the circumstances, and their
best prudential judgment of what will work-without either on
the one hand adopting a perfectionist position that regards as
immoral ever supporting imperfect laws, or on the other hand
being willing ever to engage in intrinsically immoral means even
to achieve great goods. Whichever course is chosen, it should
57. See 2 GERMAIN GRISEZ, Patriotism, Politics, and Citizenship, in THE WAY OF
THE LORD JESus: LrVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE 835-911 (1993).
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follow upon discussion with pro-life friends and allies. One
would not be surprised if people of "good faith, moral probity,
and legal competence" honestly disagreed about the status quo,
the net effect of the passage of such imperfect legislation, or
other matters involving judgments of prudence.58
At several points in this paper I have appealed to that earthly
wisdom that is the virtue of prudence and that supernatural wis-
dom that is faith and a gift of the Holy Spirit.59 Only by these
great virtues and gifts can a person quickly and reliably apply the
various appropriate principles with sensitivity to the range of peo-
ple and values at stake. I have outlined several important princi-
ples here that virtuous lawmakers must bear in mind in their
noble task. Two more, which I have hinted at along the way,
would be these: we must never be willing to do even a little evil in
order to bring about even a very great good; and we must with
imaginative impartiality apply the Golden Rule to our situation,
asking ourselves, for instance: were I one of the babies at risk, or
one of the mothers seeking an abortion, or one of the old people
marked for euthanasia, or some of the other politicians engaged
in this great debate, or some of the voters I represent or people I
influence, would I regard my action or inaction as fair? Having
tried one's best to think these matters through and exclude
thereby all unreasonable choices, politicians might conclude that
there are still two or more paths open to them: then they must go
for what seems best to them in the context of their particular
temperament, gifts, opportunities, commitments, and vocation.
If we are to have faith and prudence ourselves, we must culti-
vate certain attitudes of heart and mind: prayerfulness above all,
a willingness to take counsel, humility, docility to truth, respect
for our allies and an eagerness to learn from, work with and con-
sole them, self-criticism, imaginative impartiality, and love for all.
Of these habits of the heart St. James wrote:
Who among you thinks he is wise and understanding? Let
him demonstrate this by a good life in the humility that
comes from prudence. The wisdom which comes from
above is first of all pure, then peaceable, gentle, compliant,
full of mercy and good fruits, without inconstancy or insin-
cerity. And the fruit of righteousness is sown in peace for
those who cultivate peace.6"
58. See Finnis, supra note 54 (making this latter observation).
59. Cf BENEDICT M. ASHLEY, LIVING THE TRUTH IN LovE: A BIBLICAL
INTRODUCTION TO MoRAL THEOLOGY (1996); ROMANUS CESSARIO, THE MORAL
VIRTUES AND THEOLOGICAL ETHICS (1991).
60. James 3:13-18.
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B. The Virtue of (Political) Courage
In addition to faith and prudence, the task of the Christian
legislator requires a great deal of fortitude: whichever of the vari-
ous reasonable positions outlined above politicians take, they will
meet a great deal of hostility from foes and even from those they
might have thought they could count on as allies-those who
share many of their views and sympathies. Taking such a stance,
like taking a conscientious stance on many other contentious
issues, can come at great personal cost, including some cost to
one's prospects in one's party or electorate. 6 This should not,
perhaps, be overestimated: even political opponents and voters
who hold a different view are likely to respect a stance taken out
of conviction rather than political ambition. But a degree of her-
oism may nonetheless be called for, and Christians will naturally
turn to God, their Church, their friends, and families for support
in such situations; in the meantime, the politician must cultivate
the virtue of courage.
Called to serve the people and the common good, they
have a duty to make courageous choices in support of life,
especially through legislative measures. In a democratic
system, where laws and decisions are made on the basis of
the consensus of many, the sense of personal responsibility
in the consciences of individuals invested with authority
may be weakened. But no one can ever renounce this
responsibility, especially when they have a legislative or
decision-making mandate, which calls that person to
answer to God, to his or her own conscience and to the
whole of society for choices which may be contrary to the
common good.62
C. Unity of Purpose; Diversity in Strategies; Charity in Everything
Vatican II taught that Christians "must recognize the legiti-
macy of different opinions" in political matters.6"
Often enough the Christian view of things will itself
suggest some specific solution in certain circumstances.
Yet it happens rather frequently, and legitimately so, that
with equal sincerity some of the faithful will disagree with
others on a given matter. Even against the intentions of
their proponents, however, solutions proposed on one side
or another may be easily confused by many people with the
61. Cf EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, No. 74.
62. Id. No. 90.
63. GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 1, No. 75.
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Gospel message. Hence it is necessary for people to
remember that no one is allowed in the aforementioned
situations to appropriate the Church's authority for his
own opinion. They should always try to enlighten one
another through honest discussion, preserving mutual
charity and caring above all for the common good.64
Sadly, this recognition of legitimate diversity is not always evident
in bio-politics. Down through the ages, even great saints have
differed over what course was wisest in particular situations. We
must therefore be loath to judge our confreres who differ from
us on prudential matters in the battle against abortion and
euthanasia. Nor can we rightly claim for ourselves a monopoly
on prudence or on the authentic interpretation or application of
principles about which there has as yet been no definitive clarifi-
cation. Above all, we must avoid the tendency to consider a per-
son or a group less good-willed or less committed to the pro-life
effort because they have a different legislative strategy from our
own.65 In this context, the Vatican Congregation for the Doc-
trine of the Faith's Archbishop Bertone noted that collaborations
with less-than-perfect but better laws are not idle compromises
with evil, but different ways of affirming truth and goodness. He
scolded those who too readily brand the supporters of imperfect
bio-laws as persons of faint heart or weak character, and those
who write off the opponents of less-than-perfect bio-laws as
extremists or extraterrestrials.66 He suggested that the Church
64. Id. No. 43.
65. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, No. 91.
66. Bertone noted that collaborations with less-than-perfect but better
laws are not necessarily "idle compromises with evil," but rather:
different ways of affirming truth and goodness in the world, bearing in
mind their concrete and often complex co-ordinates. In this respect,
they are revealed as belonging to the same nature as the first attitude
[of prophetic resistance], i.e. they form part of the dynamism intrinsic
to the truth that tries to affirm itself in the world in order to redeem it
and lead it definitively to trinitarian fullness. It follows from this that
the person who tolerates imperfect laws, or the person who collaborates
with them [in the particular sense discussed above], must not be
judged by his fellow Christian, who actively resists them, as a person of
faint heart or weak character, but as a brother who tries to bury in the
infinitely diversified soil of the contemporary world 'a grain a mustard
seed' (cf Matthew 13:31-32 and parallels) that could become ... a
great tree.
Contrariwise, the person who resists "unjust laws" must not be
considered by his fellow Christian who tolerates them or collaborates
with them, in the sense pointed out above, as a brother who has
sprung from another planet or as an extremist cut off from reality, but
rather as a true champion of truth in the world. Here the Pauline idea
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and the pro-life movement ought to be capable of generating
diverse approaches to these matters while remaining, despite all
the differences, within the bond of communion.
D. Humility and Hope
I suggested earlier that humility is an important virtue for
the politician in this area. Legislators must be aware that there is
only so much they can do, especially with such blunt instruments
as laws and social policies. As the Church's corrections of com-
munism, fascism, and, in some of its forms, liberation theology
have made clear, there is a kind of heresy in the Enlightenment's
notion that salvation for society can be found by law and policy.
Vices like disrespect for innocent life certainly require the best
efforts of the state to "make men moral":6 7 but in the end it will
take more than this.
I suspect that for three decades now the Church and the
pro-life movement around the world have over-estimated the
power of bio-legislation. As the Psalmist warns us, "put not your
trust in princes."6 There are many countries with very strong
laws against abortion-at least on the statute books-but where,
for the reasons discussed earlier, such laws are of little or no
effect. Pope John Paul II more than adequately identified the
underlying ideological, economic, and political causes of this.
His chilling conclusion is well known: there has emerged in the
West "a culture which denies solidarity and in many cases takes
the form of a veritable 'culture of death.' This culture is actively
fostered by powerful cultural, economic and political currents
.... In this way a kind of 'conspiracy against life' is unleashed."69
In the midst of such a dramatic conflict between the culture of
death and the culture of life there is only so much lawmakers can
do. This does not mean that efforts to hold the line and gradu-
ally to improve the legal situation are irrelevant: they may save
some individual lives; and they may have an educative effect on
society. But it does mean that much greater efforts are needed
of the different charisms in a single Body might apply (cf 1 Corinthians
12:1 if).
... [T]he Church ought to be capable of generating her own
[diverse] heralds of truth and ensuring that they remain, despite all
their differences, within the bond of communion.
Bertone, supra note 33, at 219-20.
67. "[L]awgivers make men good by habituating them to good works."
AQUINAS, supra note 11, Pt. I-II, Q. 92, Art. 1, Obj. 1 & Respondeo (citing AMIS-
TOTLE, POLITICS (ETHIC. ii)).
68. Psalms 146:3.
69. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 10, No. 12 (emphasis added).
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to get to the heart of why otherwise civilized societies have
become so blind to the blood flowing in their streets. Without a
massive re-evangelization of culture, such laws are likely to
remain largely dead letters.
John Finnis has observed that at the root of the present dis-
array and demoralization in Western Church and society is the
practical elimination of transcendent hope: "It is obviously a pre-
condition of sustainable engagement in public policy debates
that one keep bright one's hope, and keep clear and firm the
presuppositions of that hope."7 We must pray that, in living out
the imperative to be "unconditionally pro-life" in a new century
and millennium, politicians, pro-life activists, lobbyists, and their
sympathizers will always hold fast to that hope, even when the
political scene is difficult to negotiate and potentially demoraliz-
ing. For in the end we know that we side with Him who came so
that we might have life, and have it to the full.7'
The entire creation has been groaning till now in an act of
giving birth, as it waits for the glory of the children of God
to be revealed (cf Romans 8:22). Let Christians therefore
be convinced that they will yet find the fruits of their own
nature and effort cleansed of all impurities in the new
earth which God is now preparing for them, and in which
there will be the kingdom of justice and love, a kingdom
which will be fully perfected when the Lord will come
himself.72
70. Finnis, supra note 36, at 266.
71. See John 10:10.
72. SECOND ORDINARY GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE WORLD SYNOD OF CATH-
OLIC BISHOPS, JUSTICA IN MUNDO: JUSTICE IN THE WORLD No. 75 (1971).
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